The Role of the Neutral States in Soviet Foreign Policy Strategy, 1969–1975

This proposed Austro-Russian research project, which will be conducted in close cooperation with international partners like Harvard and Stockholm University, will focus on the history of the development of the CSCE process. It will concentrate on how Moscow saw the role of the four neutral states Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland, how the USSR used these states for its own interests to the extent, in fact, of manipulating them and if and how the activities of these neutral states manifested themselves in decisions made by Moscow. Research on Soviet policy toward the neutral countries has been very difficult until recently, for the simple reason that the relevant sources in Russian archives have been off-limits. The highly welcome declassification of vast numbers of documents has enabled us to provide the first in-depth analysis of Soviet policy toward these four countries during the crucial phase of East-West détente and the CSCE negotiations. The documental basis accessible to the project team allows us to open up new frontiers of research. To name but one outstanding example: the archival holdings related to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and the Politburo, stored in the Russian State Archive for Contemporary History (RGANI), have only recently been declassified. In the tradition of international research projects of the Ludwig Boltzmann-Institute for Research on Consequences of War, the results of the project will be published in various publications in both German and English. Three books of the institute have already been published in the renowned Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series.

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has brought neutrality in East-West relations back into focus. Sweden has applied to and Finland already joined NATO. The research project funded by the Austrian Scientific Fund "The Role of Neutral States in Soviet Foreign Policy Strategy, 1969-1975", headed by Peter Ruggenthaler, was devoted to Soviet policy towards the neutral states Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria during the decisive phase of East - West détente and the CSCE negotiations in the Cold War. Moscow had insisted on a pan- European security order since the mid-1950s and struggled for Western approval. The General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid I. Brezhnev, took up the old Soviet idea again and, with persistence and pragmatism, succeeded in turning the idea into a project and the project into reality. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in 1975 formulated principles for relations between the 35 signatory states (the European states incl. the Soviet Union as well as the United States and Canada), including the renunciation of the use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, respect for human rights and non-interference in internal affairs. In addition, a framework for pan- European cooperation in economics, science, culture and technology was created and humanitarian issues were defined as an integral part of international relations. For the realization of the conference, Brezhnev counted on the advocacy of the smaller and neutral European states. The neutrals ultimately took part in the negotiations on an equal footing, coordinated closely with one another and therefore had comparatively great influence in international diplomacy. While for Finland the CSCE project was a further step in minimizing Soviet influence, Sweden and Switzerland at first acted cautiously. For Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, the CSCE was marked by three disappointments: it ultimately did not take place in Vienna, the Middle East issue was not on the agenda, and diplomats negotiated instead of state and government representatives in Geneva and Helsinki. The Austrian diplomats successfully lobbied for the so-called "Third Basket" (humanitarian provisions). In doing so, they met with resistance - including from Kreisky, who did not believe that concessions could be extracted from the East by means of a conference paper. Moscow saw Kreisky as a possible accomplice to bring the Basket 3 negotiations to a speedy conclusion. Indeed, during his visit to Moscow in 1974, Kreisky advocated a quick conclusion, partly because he saw Austria as an "economic stronghold" for cooperation with the East, as Anna Graf-Steiner argues in her monograph to be published by Leykam in fall 2023. In close cooperation with the universities of Harvard, Stockholm, Helsinki and colleagues from Switzerland, further (joint) publications are in preparation.